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Good morning. I am very pleasedto addressthe Bank of Japan international conference.
On behalf of my colleagues at the Bank of Japan, I welcome all the participants from
central banks, international organizations, and academia.
I. Interaction between the Financial System and Monetary Policy
This year’s conference focuses on the theme of “Financial System and Monetary Pol-
icy Implementation.” The two things in the theme are closely interacted. That inter-
action has been consistently posing important policy challenges to the Bank of Japan
since the late 1980s, when the bubble emerged. That seems to be increasingly the case
for central banks in other countries as well. In fact, the interaction has gradually but
steadily attracted both policymakers and academics, and has become a popular theme
for research conferences. We have certainly beneﬁted from such developments. For this
conference, leading economists have contributed six stimulating papers. Distinguished
policymakers are getting together to discuss the current policy challenges at the policy
panel session.
I look back, with somewhat mixed feelings, on the past discussions on the policy
responses to the bubble and its bursting. Several points come to mind immediately:
20yearsago,whenJapan’sbubblewasatitspeak.Tenyearsago,whenJapan’sﬁnancial
crisis was at its peak. Several years ago, when the global economy was in the era of
“great moderation.” Two years ago, when the global credit bubble came to the surface
as the U.S. subprime mortgage problem. And even more recently just at this time last
year. I see long and winding evolution taking place in the way of thinking over time.
Up until the mid-2000s, Japanese participants in international conferences, includ-
ing myself, often felt frustrated both at home and abroad: on the one hand, the delay in
necessary actions at home such as injection of public capital, and, on the other hand, the
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system after the bursting of the bubble.
1 The delay in policy actions was in part due to
the political difﬁculty of persuasion. One factor behind this seems to be the fact that
ﬁnancial institutions were unpopular, as always. But, most fundamentally, we were not
equipped with economic theory to fully address the core of the problem.
In those days, we made the most of academic wisdom, but we often encountered
situations that were not well captured by the existing economic theory. For example,
ﬁnancial imbalances were built up under benign economic conditions, through sharp
credit expansion, outsized leverage, and soaring asset prices.
2 After the bursting of
the bubble, market participants suddenly lost their conﬁdence and reduced their risk-
taking capacity. As a result, the effectiveness of monetary policy was severely con-
strained. Further monetary policy responses with unorthodox measures were adopted.
The effectiveness of monetary policy measures crucially depends on the central bank’s
credibility, which is partly affected by the soundness of the central bank balance sheet
and the central bank’s neutrality perceived by the public at large. All in all, those expe-
riences seem to show that textbooks on macro and monetary economics need some new
chapters on the interaction between the ﬁnancial system and monetary policy.
The way of thinking about monetary policy management has certainly changed
since the outbreak of global ﬁnancial market turmoil in the summer of 2007. In particu-
lar, since the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September last year, the policy discussions
have changed further with the ﬁrst-hand experiences of the downward spiral in both the
ﬁnancial and real sectors of the economy. It has turned out that Japan’s experience is no
longer unique.
II. Adoption of Unprecedented Policy Measures:
Japan’s Experiences
I will provide a basis for discussion by reviewing the Bank of Japan’s policy imple-
mentation during the ﬁnancial crisis after the bursting of the bubble, especially since
the late 1990s. Of course, various measures were taken in the ﬁelds of central banking.
Here my focus is on monetary policy.
The Bank of Japan’s policy responses can be summarized into ﬁve points. First,
the Bank lowered overnight interest rates in the interbank market down to virtually
zero, eventually just one-10th of a basis point (0.001 percent). Second, the Bank pro-
vided ample excess reserves by using various tools for monetary operations, including
an increase in the outright purchase of long-term government bonds. For the smooth
provision of ample liquidity, the maturity of monetary operations lengthened, running
for 10 months in bill-purchase operations at the ﬁnal stage of the quantitative easing
policy. “Quantitative easing” is often used in a rather vague manner, but the policy
action we adopted can be regarded as a pure form of “quantitative easing.” Third, the
1. Japan’s 1990s is often referred to as the “lost decade.” For the appropriateness of such characterization and
policy responses, see Shirakawa (2009a).
2. Among the papers contributed to the conference, Hattori, Shin, and Takahashi (2009) revisit Japan’s bubble in
the 1980s by shedding light on the changes in money ﬂow behind the expansion of the bubble.
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Bank adopted “credit easing” in the current terminology. The assets purchased included
asset-backed securities (ABSs) and asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP). Fourth,
the Bank made a commitment to continuing with the zero interest rate policy and the
quantitative easing policy. The conditions for commitment were expressed as “until
deﬂationary concerns are dispelled” at the time of the zero interest rate policy and
“until core CPI inﬂation becomes stably zero or above” at the time of the quantitative
easing policy. Fifth, the Bank took unprecedented measures to secure the stability of
the ﬁnancial system, including purchases of stocks held by ﬁnancial institutions.
You may ﬁnd striking similarities between the policy measures formerly taken by
the Bank of Japan and those currently taken by central banks in major countries. I never
imagined that a host of unconventional measures taken by the Bank of Japan would be
adopted by other central banks just a few years later. I also guess that my colleagues
at central banks in other countries never imagined employing such policy measures.
Of course, such measures are not perfectly identical, reﬂecting the differences in the
structure of ﬁnancial intermediation and severity of stress in ﬁnancial markets, as well
as the differences in legal and social restrictions on policy measures available for central
banks. Notwithstanding such differences, the aforementioned striking similarities stand
out. It is quite natural that a central bank facing a ﬁnancial crisis takes similar measures,
because a central bank, after all, pursues the same objectives with the same capacity,
that is, the capacity to adjust the amount of liquidity in the economy.
3
III. Importance of Liquidity
This leads me to discussing liquidity, which, I think, is the most important concept
in understanding the current ﬁnancial crisis, though it is hardly possible to sort out
a single factor. During the expansion period of the credit bubble, complacency based
on unfounded expectations about the unlimited availability of liquidity was behind the
aggressive risk-taking attitude. By contrast, during the period of bubble bursting, it was
fear of the exhaustion of liquidity that caused an extraordinary contraction of economic
activity. In addition, liquidity conditions signiﬁcantly changed the valuation of ﬁnancial
assets, thereby inﬂuencing the capital positions of ﬁnancial institutions.
Here, I use the term of “liquidity” as the concept incorporating both funding liquid-
ity and market liquidity. But I have to admit that “liquidity” is hardly deﬁned precisely
and measured exactly in a quantitative manner, and thus it remains somewhat elusive.
Nevertheless, anybody can surely assess “liquidity” to a certain extent. After all, liquid-
ity is the core concept in understanding interdependence between the real and ﬁnancial
sectors of the economy from the beginning of central banking. The principal function
of central banks has been and will be the guardian of liquidity.
From the standpoint I just mentioned, it is crucially important for a central bank
to adequately control the aggregate amount of liquidity in the economy. Please note,
however, that the concept of liquidity here does not necessarily correspond just to
the terms of broad monetary aggregates or reserves. In fact, the reversed correlations
3. Among the papers contributed to the conference, Goodfriend (2009) argues central banking under ﬁnancial
turmoil by classifying central bank initiatives into monetary policy, credit policy, and interest rate policy.
21between money stock and economic activity are almost consistently observed in recent
years in Japan: money stocks increase when economic activity weakens, while they
decrease when economic activity expands. The money multiplier is also quite unstable.
IV. Challenges for Central Banks
If this is the case, what does it mean practically to say liquidity is important? I will
touch brieﬂy upon some issues and challenges for central banks, based upon the
recent experiences.
First of all, I want to draw your attention to a ﬁne line between liquidity provision
and capital provision. Currently, central banks are faced with an imminent challenge
of implementing unorthodox policy measures. The traditional role of a central bank is
in providing liquidity. In times of crisis, a central bank attempts to provide liquidity
aggressively sometimes with taking some credit risk. The relaxation of collateral eligi-
bility is a case in point. In a dysfunctional market where prices are not “discovered,”
it is not so certain that a central bank is protected from credit risk, even if central
bank lending is “collateralized.” That makes it difﬁcult to distinguish liquidity pro-
vision from capital provision. Outright purchases of credit instruments imply that a
central bank shoulders credit risk in a more straightforward manner. In that regard,
monetary policy approaches the region of ﬁscal policy. Under such circumstances, a
central bank should be cautious about the risks of undermining its credibility, which is
prerequisite for any policy implementation. The issues such as deterioration in ﬁnancial
soundness and massive intervention for resource allocation at an individual level are
now recognized. Central banks in major countries manage to strike a balance between
the ultimate responsibility of maintaining price and ﬁnancial stability on the one hand
and the accountability in a democratic society on the other hand. Although there is no
clear-cut answer holding true universally, the public needs to understand the role of
central banks correctly.
Second, central banks are supposed to work hard as a “plumber” in facilitating
the smooth and efﬁcient ﬂow of funds.
4 An important area is the payment and settle-
ment system and our own procedure of monetary operation. Taking an example of the
cross-border collateral arrangement, the Bank of Japan decided last week to expand
its eligible collateral to foreign government bonds denominated in foreign currencies
as a temporary measure. That arrangement enables ﬁnancial institutions to use foreign
currency denominated foreign bonds as collateral for yen-fund provision operations
by the Bank.
Third, redesigning ﬁnancial regulation and supervision, jointly with other relevant
authorities, is called for.
5 In view of the current crisis, not only credit risk but also
market and funding liquidity risk need to be addressed. Speciﬁcally, the problem of
pro-cyclicality should be addressed by establishing proper incentive structures for rules
and market practices to control the incentives at both micro- and macro-levels.
4. See Tucker (2009).
5. See also Shirakawa (2009b).
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Last but not least, I will draw your attention to how monetary policy should be con-
ducted, once we fully recognize the importance of liquidity. Here, research activity at
central banks is crucial. For example, the current ﬁnancial crisis sheds light on the risk-
taking channel of monetary policy, stemming from the changes in liquidity conditions.
The risk-taking channel works in the nexus between monetary policy and behavior
of ﬁnancial institutions.
6 The prolonged low interest rates under benign ﬁnancial and
economic conditions tend to create overconﬁdence and thus boost asset prices and col-
lateral values as well as incomes and proﬁts, thereby leading to affecting risk perception
as well as enhancing risk tolerance. As a result, aggressive risk-taking behavior in the
ﬁnancial system surges, while a resultant build-up of ﬁnancial imbalances is likely to be
left unchecked. Such ﬁnancial imbalances come to the surface only once the economic
environment starts deteriorating.
Considering the complicated transmission channel and the behavioral aspect of
various economic agents, how to frame monetary policy is quite a challenge. For in-
stance, in its explanation, the time horizon for monetary policy needs to be extended,
compared with the standard time horizon generally assumed in the formal inﬂation
targeting. In this case, another important policy challenge is posed as to how to ensure
the transparency of monetary policy.
V. Closing Remarks
Let me conclude now. In response to the current ﬁnancial crisis, the policy discus-
sions are continuing about wide-ranging issues on not only monetary policy manage-
ment but also ﬁnancial regulation and supervision. Dialogue between academics and
policymakers plays a crucial role in discussing and formulating necessary actions in
both short- and medium- to long-term perspectives. In that regard, I am convinced
that this year’s conference will produce further insights into more effective central
bank policymaking.
Thank you.
6. See Borio and Zhu (2008).
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